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We are fools for Christ's sake.
-Justice Antonin Scalia (1996)
I want to hang around and prevent those jokers
from overruling Roe.
-Justice Harry Blackmun (1994)
I. INTRODUCTION: AYATOLLAH ScAiA?
Justice Antonin Scalia's flamboyant judicial rhetoric and colorful
writing style more than occasionally make headlines. Seemingly alone
among the justices, Scalia is the master of the eminently quotable
turn-of-phrase, the arresting quip, the provocatively expressed legal
argument. Small wonder, then, that Justice Scalia made the front
page of The Washington Post'-and several other papers across the na-
tion-when last spring, shortly before Easter, he declared that Chris-
tians "are fools for Christ's sake."
The context was not a judicial opinion, but a prayer breakfast at
the First Baptist Church in Jackson, Mississippi, on April 9, 1996.
Scalia had been invited to address a group of Christian lawyers and
law students about their common faith. The gist of Scalia's remarks,
according to press accounts, 2 was that traditional Christian beliefs are
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
t Associate, Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago, Illinois.
1 Joan Biskupic, Scalia Makes the Case for Christianity:Justice Proclaims Belief in Mira-
cles, WASH. PosT, Apr. 10, 1996, at Al.
2 A public text of Scalia's remarks is not available. Scalia did not make a text
available to the press or public through the Supreme Court's public affairs office,
perhaps because he did not regard his remarks as a matter of "public affairs" in the
sense of involving Court business. Newspaper accounts of Scalia's remarks have relied
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often misunderstood, dismissed as unreflective and, even worse,
scorned by much of society today.
To illustrate his point, Scalia invoked the subject of miracles.
"Reason and intellect," he asserted, "are not to be laid aside where
matters of religion are concerned. What is irrational to reject is the
possibility of miracles and the resurrection of Jesus Christ." Yet the
evident view of "the worldly wise," he continued, is that "everything
from Easter morning to the Ascension had to be made up by the
groveling enthusiasts as part of their plan to get themselves martyred."
Then, referring to a 1992 account of a priest who reported bleed-
ing wounds, or "stigmata," resembling those Christ suffered, Scalia
puzzled: "The Washington Post sends out a team of reporters who pro-
duce a strangely ambivalent story about this phenomenon. The
thought occurred to me: Why wasn't that church absolutely packed
with nonbelievers? ... Why weren't the Washington Post reporters, if
they couldn't explain the phenomenon, absolute converts?"
Finally, after observing that the disparaging term "cretin" derives
from the French word for "Christian," Scalia declared: "To be honest
about it, that is the view of Christians taken by modern society. We
are fools for Christ's sake. We must pray for the courage to endure
the scorn of the modern world."
Despite the fact that Scalia's sermonette was delivered in an extra-
judicial context-or perhaps because it was made outside the judicial
role-Scalia's "unusually sharp remarks" were subjected to a barrage
of criticism. 3 In some quarters, Scalia was accused of having a "perse-
cution complex."4 Court-watcher Stuart Taylor, writing for The Ameri-
can Lawyer, likened Scalia to the "whining wimps of victimology" who
appear on television talk shows.5 In a more provocative statement,
Taylor charged that Scalia's reaction to The Washington Post'sjournal-
ism was 'Just a teensy bit reminiscent of the Ayatollah Khomeini's re-
action to Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses." 6 What was "really
offensive" about "Scalia's whiny outburst," Taylor declared, "was his
flirtation with Christian victimology, which evinced either a quite fatu-
ous persecution complex, or a predisposition to intolerance, or a will-
ingness to parrot unthinkingly the kind of nonsense that is often
heard from the likes of Pat Robertson and Patrick Buchanan."
7
on reports from the Jackson Clarion-Ledger and the Associated Press, as confirmed by
those in attendance.
3 Biskupic, supra note 1, at Al.
4 Stuart Taylor, Jr., Justice Scalia's Persecution Complex, AM. LAW., June 1996, at 37.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 37-39.
7 Id. at 39.
[VOL. 72:3
SCALIA'S SERMONETTE
In an interview for The Washington Post, James Dunn, executive
director of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, echoed a
similar sentiment "This is becoming a modem myth that religion is
somehow persecuted in American life."
It's a right-wing litmus test. If you don't say religion is beat up on,
then you aren't pitifully correct. Everyone is competing to see who
can whine the loudest.... If the American people were as anti-
religious as everyone says, then a Supreme Court justice wouldn't
have the right to run around saying things like that.9
Still others thought that a Supreme Court justice shouldn't have
the right to run around saying things like that-that Scalia's remarks
cast doubt on his ability to execute the duties of his judicial office.
Clay Chandler, a staff writer for The Washington Post, for example, que-
ried whether Scalia's comments weren't "difficult to reconcile with his
judicial obligation to regard citizens of all religious persuasions-
whether believer or nonbeliever, Christian or non-Christian-as
equals under the law."' 0 "At issue," declared Chandler, "is whether
Scalia's impassioned and remarkably personal defense of Christian-
ity... clashed with his sworn duty to impartially interpret U.S. laws,
including those pertaining to religion."" Barry Lynn, of Americans
United for the Separation of Church and State, told USA Today that
Scalia's speech "clearly undermines public confidence in his objectiv-
ity regarding religious controversies."' 2 ProfessorJamin B. Raskin of
American University told The Washington Post, "We expect Supreme
Court justices to be the most secular of our public servants. That is
not to say they can't have religious beliefs. But for good reasons, we
are uncomfortable about them flaunting those beliefs." Scalia, Raskin
urged, "stepped over the line of what was proper.' 3 Stuart Taylor,
while acknowledging that other justices, among them Thurgood Mar-
shall and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, have identified with civil rights causes
both on and off the bench, nonetheless concluded that Scalia's "Bible-
thumping" remarks "hardly inspire confidence in his open-
mindedness."
14
8 Biskupic, supra note 1, at Al (quoting James Dunn).
9 Id. (quotingJames Dunn).
10 Clay Chandler, Scalia's Religion Remarks: Just a Matter of Free Speech ?, WASH. POsT,
Apr. 15, 1996, at F7 (Washington Business section).
11 Id.
12 Robert A. Sirico, Scalia's Dissenting Opinion, WALL ST.J., Apr. 19, 1996, at A12
(quoting Barry Lynn).
13 Chandler, supra note 10, at F7 (quotingJamin B. Raskin).
14 Taylor, supra note 4, at 39.
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In our judgment, Scalia's remarks-and especially the remarka-
ble reaction they elicited-do indeed have much to say about open-
mindedness, tolerance, objectivity, and judicial ethics. But the lessons
they teach are precisely the opposite of those urged by Scalia's critics.
The reactions to Antonin Scalia's prayer breakfast homily reflect a
shocking ignorance about Christian theology and biblical literature,
about the First Amendment's protections of freedom of speech and of
religion, and about the role of religion (and personal statements
about religion) in a pluralistic public square.
The more alarmist reactions to Scalia's statement that "We are
fools for Christ's sake," for example, seemed to assume that this was
another Scalia Original, rather than an obvious quotation from St.
Paul's first epistle to the Christian church at Corinth, in which Paul
compared the wisdom of humankind with the wisdom of God. Scalia
was scarcely fashioning his imagery from whole cloth, but invoking
what is-or should be-a familiar literary reference in Western cul-
ture. The pundits' near-universal failure to recognize it ironically vali-
dates Scalia's point: the "wise" of this world do not understand,
appreciate, or respect Christianity (or religion in general, for that
matter). Indeed, they appear to lack even a basic level of education
about the literature and beliefs of the most influential religious and
cultural tradition in Western history.
But suppose Scalia's remarks were solely the product of his own
observations. Does his frank discussion of religion really cast doubt
on his ability impartially to execute his judicial duties? Is it really true,
as one "practicing attorney and ethics expert who asked not to be
identified" chided, that Scalia "shouldn't be saying anything like that
because it's going to come up before the court[, and because,] [i]f
he's got anything to say about religion or anything else, he should say
it in his opinions[, because] [t]hose are the rules"?' 5
We think the answer to these questions is plainly "no." Yet the
idea is abroad, at least in some quarters, that Scalia's speech was not
only an inaccurate account of the treatment of religion in American
public life, but ethically improper. To see why this view is so badly
mistaken, it is necessary to explore the several areas of his critics' mis-
understandings: Christian theology, judicial ethics, and constitutional
law.




The critics' first misunderstanding of Scalia's remarks is at the
level of theology. Not to put too fine a point on it, Scalia's critics
literally did not understand what he was talking about. In fact, the
level of raw theological, cultural, and even literary ignorance reflected
in their comments is so astonishing as itself to be a scathing indict-
ment of elite culture.
Indicting the media was not Scalia's point, however-and that is
part of what his critics missed. Justice Scalia was not launching a pub-
licjeremiad against the media and public culture. That indeed might
have been newsworthy. Rather, Antonin Scalia, the man, was giving a
homily for a prayer breakfast, offering encouragement and support
for Christian men and women studying law (the event was sponsored
by a student chapter of the Christian Legal Society) and preparing to
enter a profession where the values of the Lord and the values of the
Law are often seen as conflicting. That, too, might be newsworthy,
but not at all in the way that the media pitched the story. Antonin
Scalia, the Supreme Court Justice, did not release a public text-if
indeed he even used one. Apparently, Scalia did not understand his
homily to be addressed to the public at large, but to this particular
assembled group.
The Court Watchers, of course, seem to have found in this some-
thing sinister: Why no text? What's Scalia up to? What are the impli-
cations for the Court? For the presidential election? Such questions
are sadly symptomatic of the media's own myopic and self-important
view of the world, in which everything is seen through the eyes of a
Supreme Court beat reporter. We hate to break the news to the Joan
Biskupics and Stuart Taylors of the world: this speech wasn't about
you. It wasn't about politics, it wasn't about constitutional law, and it
wasn't about social issues. It was about the clash of world views be-
tween Christianity and today's dominant culture. It was about the dif-
ficulties of being a Christian in a secular world-our culture and,
especially, our legal culture. It is not surprising that the reporters, like
the "worldly wise" generally, missed the point, for Scalia's remarks do
not fit into secular society's boxes for understanding the way things
work in the world (which, indeed, was part of Scalia's point).
To his audience, and to persons literate in matters of religion and
culture, Scalia's remarks are familiar-but not any the less uplifting-
references to the Apostle Paul's first letter to the Corinthians. Scalia's
point, echoing Paul's, was that Christians should not expect the world's
values to be the same as theirs and that Christians should not mimic
the world's values. Much of the first several chapters of Paul's letter to
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the Christian church at Corinth is devoted to the theme that the wis-
dom of the world is rendered foolish in comparison to God's power,
and that the message of the gospel-the "good news" ofJesus Christ-
will be regarded, wrongly, as foolishness by the wise of this world. It is
helpful to read a few full paragraphs to capture the flavor of Paul's
letter at this point:
For the word of the cross is to those who are perishing foolishness,
but to us who are being saved it is the power of God. For it is
written,
"I will destroy the wisdom of the wise,
And the cleverness of the clever I will set aside."
Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is the de-
bater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the
world? For since in the wisdom of God the world through its wis-
dom did not come to know God, God was well-pleased through the
foolishness of the message preached to save those who believe. For
indeed Jews ask for signs, and Greeks search for wisdom; but we
preach Christ crucified, to Jews a stumbling block, and to Gentiles
foolishness, but to those who are the called, both Jews and Greeks,
Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God. Because the fool-
ishness of God is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is
stronger than men. 16
This is one of the most powerfully argued and theologically im-
portant passages in Paul's letters. Paul, a lawyer of his day, makes a
sophisticated "legal" argument explaining and defending the gospel
and distinguishing the case for the gospel of Jesus Christ from the
case of its opponents. He proceeds by recognizing, and embracing, the
fact that the message of Jesus Christ is, from a human standpoint,
scandalous. To Jews, the idea that the Messiah would be hung from a
cross in humiliation was offensive to prevailing ideas of what the Mes-
siah would be and do: a political leader who would restore the Davidic
kingdom. To Greeks (a generic label for those embracing various phi-
losophies not derived from Judaism), the idea that God would be-
come Man, die as a sacrifice for humankind, and rise from the dead to
restore a relationship between God and all humankind, is quite simply
nonsense. And it is: viewed from a human perspective, Christianity is
hardly a reasonable-sounding religion.
Paul, a Pharisee, had been not only a skeptic but a ruthless perse-
cutor of Christianity on these grounds. It was only through a personal
encounter and transformation that he became first-century Christian-
16 1 Cor. 1:18-25 (New American Standard Version).
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ity's leading exponent and theological theorist.17 Paul's point, as ex-
pressed in Corinthians, was that God is not subject to Man's criteria of
wisdom or sensibility; God is God. If one insists on subjecting God to
human criteria, Paul argues, one will never see God as He is. In a
sense this is tautological, and Paul recognizes this, but it also explains
why the world will be resistant to the life-view of Christians. Paul
continues:
Now we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit who
is from God, that we might know the things freely given to us by
God, which things we also speak, not in words taught by human
-wisdom, but in those taught by the Spirit, combining spiritual
thoughts with spiritual words. But a natural man does not accept the
things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness to him, and he cannot
understand them, because they are spiritually appraised. But he who is
spiritual appraises all things, yet he himself is appraised by no man.
For who has known the mind of the Lord, that he should instruct
Him? But we have the mind of Christ.' 8
Justice Scalia's speech fits squarely within this Pauline tradition.
Indeed, the expression that seemed to cause the media critics the
most consternation-"fools for Christ's sake"-comes straight from 1
Corinthians 4, where Paul uses it to mock the Corinthians' claims that
they already were wise and complete in their knowledge. To think
that Antonin Scalia was, in his address to the Christian Legal Society,
railing against the media's and the elite culture's treatment of Chris-
tians is self-absorbedly to miss the main point. To be sure, Scalia
noted the myriad ways in which the world's values and beliefs are dif-
ferent from those held by faithful Christians-and some of these dif-
ferences are of course quite jarring-but the burden of his remarks
was not so much to indict today's culture as to note the proper Chris-
tian attitude toward it.
In short, Scalia was attempting not so much to be a prophet, railing
against a sinful, wicked world, but a priest, seeking to help his fellow
believers deal with such a world. For Christian law students (and
Christian lawyers), the tension between being a Christian and the
study and practice of law can be very real. It was surely comforting,
perhaps even inspiring, for this Christian Legal Society audience to
hear these echoes of the Apostle Paul coming from a man who had
reached the pinnacle of the American legal profession, whose opin-
ions very often show great skill in the ways of the debaters of this age.
17 See Acts 9:1-22. For a modem historian's account, see PAUL JOHNSON, A His-
TORY OF CHmRsTNIny 3-5, 35-42 (1976).
18 1 Cor. 2:12-16 (New American Standard Version) (emphasis added).
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For such a man to recognize that worldly wisdom, knowledge, and
skill are as nothing compared to the wisdom of God was surely a pow-
erful testimony to those assembled to hear him. Indeed, viewed at all
charitably, Scalia's remarks demonstrate Christian humility. It is
ironic, but not entirely surprising, that the media and pundits-so ac-
customed to Scalia's barbed wit, his brash style in judicial opinions, his
combative and sometimes high-handed style of shredding his oppo-
nents' legal arguments-would see in Scalia's prayer breakfast talk the
same attributes, rather than the humble confession of a lawyer who,
like Paul, recognizes that all such mere human wit and wisdom are as
nothing compared to the authority of God.
While the event was not closed-door Oust as a church worship
service is not), neither was it a public policy speech. Those who took
it that way took Scalia's remarks out of their religious, pastoral con-
text-a mistake they probably could not have made but for a rather
basic kind of cultural-religious illiteracy and a rather advanced case of
mediacentric Washington-policy-itis. In short, they mistook a prayer
breakfast for a kulturkampf.
III. FREE SPEECH AND JUDICIAL ETHics
But so what? The fact that the media crew may have misunder-
stood the provenance and purpose of Scalia's sermonette does not
answer the next question: What is a Supreme Courtjustice doing mak-
ing a speech like this (whether or not intended for public consump-
tion)? Is there not something improper here? Do we not, as
Professor Raskin asserts, "expect Supreme Court justices to be the
most secular of our public servants"?19 Doesn't making a speech like
this give reason to doubt Scalia's objectivity as ajudge, at least on mat-
ters touching religion?
At least two different lines of thought are at work in these ques-
tions, and they are often lumped together indiscriminately. The first
line has to do with the propriety of judges' extrajudicial public
speeches on matters of general public interest and, therefore, poten-
tially touching on matters that could become lawsuits. (We say "pro-
priety" because we think there should be no serious question about
the legality of such public expression; judges have First Amendment
rights of free expression that certainly are not trumped in this context
by the Model Code ofJudicial Conduct.) The second line of thought has
less to do with the fact thatjudges are engaged in public expression as
it has to do with the fact that they are engaged in public religious ex-
19 See Chandler, supra note 10, at F7.
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pression. Separating these two strands, it becomes easier to see why
the argument of impropriety is flawed.
For openers, we think it clear that judges constitutionally are per-
mitted to make extrajudicial statements, including speeches, concern-
ing whatever it is they feel like talking about, as long as they refrain
from publicly discussing a pending case or from making statements
amounting to campaign promises or pledges as to how they will rule
on a particular case or issue. That is the standard embodied in the
American Bar Association's 1990 Model Code ofJudicial Conduct, which
states thatjudges (and judicial candidates) shall not
(i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than
the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office;
[or]
(ii) make statements that commit or appear to commit the
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely
to come before the court.20
Any actual legal restriction on judges' speech that goes beyond this is
difficult to square with the First Amendment, as several courts have
held.21
20 MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 5A(3) (d) (1990). Canon 5A(3) ad-
dresses the situation of "judicial candidates." Canon 3E (1) states that "[a] judge shall
disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned," but the examples and commentary do not suggest that a
judge's impartiality can reasonably be questioned on the ground that he or she holds,
or has expressed, religious opinions, aside from a case of actual "personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party." Id. Canon 3E(1) (a) (emphasis added); see also id. Ca-
non 4A(1) ("A judge shall conduct all of the judge's extrajudicial activities so that
they do not cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as ajudge
Although the Supreme Court has not adopted any particular code of judicial
conduct, federal judges generally are governed by the Code of Conduct for United States
Judges, which contains analogous rules. See CODE OF CONDUcr FOR U.S. JUDGES, Ca-
nons 3A(6), 4A, 5A (1996).
21 A few cases have presented the question of whether judicial ethics codes, pat-
terned after American Bar Association models, might violate the First Amendment
where used to disqualify candidates for electedjudicial posts (or appointed ones, for
that matter) from expressing their views of public, includingjudicial, issues. The re-
cent trend appears to be either to adopt a narrowing construction of the codes, so as
to limit them to a prohibition on making a commitment as to how ajudge or prospec-
tivejudge will rule on a case or issue, or else to strike down such codes as unconstitu-
tionally overbroad. Compare, e.g., Buckley v. IllinoisJudicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224,
227-31 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that state judicial conduct rule prohibiting judicial
candidates from announcing views on disputed legal or political issues violated First
Amendment), with Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 141-44 (3d Cir. 1991)
(narrowly construing Pennsylvania'sjudicial conduct rule that prohibited judicial can-
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We think it follows, albeit perhaps less clearly, that it is not im-
proper, in some other sense, for a judge to make such public state-
ments. As long as the judge's extrajudicial remarks neither pertain to
a pending case nor involve a commitment as to how he will resolve a
particular legal case or issue, the judge has engaged in no act of im-
propriety concerning his judicial role. In certain contexts-confirma-
tion hearings, for example-we expect and frequently demand to
know a judge's or prospective judge's thinking and personal views
about a range of subjects, legal and political. There is nothing re-
motely improper about this; indeed, it is not only proper but affirma-
tively desirable that the public understand the thinking, world view,
and political opinions of prospective judges.
22
The argument of impropriety is rarely, if ever, employed to assert
that a judge's exercise of his rights of free expression involves an ac-
tual impropriety-that is, one that would give rise to a legal entitle-
ment of a party to disqualify a judge for bias or conflict of interest.
Rather, the argument is usually couched in terms of "appearance of
impropriety." Nearly all of the tirades against Scalia's sermonette fall
into this category. None of the pundits (as far as we are aware) at-
tempts a serious argument that Scalia's religious remarks are actually
disqualifying as to his fitness to sit on the bench generally, or to ad-
dress some category of legal questions (such as religious freedom or
abortion issues). Rather, Scalia's remarks are thought to create ques-
tions in some minds, or are said to "hardly inspire confidence in his
open-mindedness.
23
The problem with appearance of impropriety arguments is that,
quite frequently, they are all "appearance" and no "impropriety"-
and the appearance is in the eye of the beholder (or the accuser).
Consider the pair of quotations with which we began this essay. Sit-
ting Justice Antonin Scalia quotes scripture to a prayer breakfast on
didates from announcing views on disputed legal or political issues, to avoid First
Amendment violation).
22 Michael Stokes Paulsen, Straightening Out The Confirmation Mess, 105 YALE LJ.
549, 562-75 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEAN-
ING UP THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994)).
Justice Scalia's more recent remarks, at Catholic University's School of Philoso-
phy, that "there is no right to die" in the Constitution, see Scalia: 'There Is No Right to
Die': Supreme Court Justice Criticized over Speech, CHI. TmB., Oct. 29, 1996, at A6, come
much closer to the line (especially with a case presenting such an issue pending
before the Supreme Court), but, in context, probably fall short of a commitment as to
how Scalia will rule in a particular case. See also infra note 24 and accompanying text
(comparing former Justice Blackmun's remarks that he needed to stay on the Court
in order to keep the Court from overruling Roe v. Wade).
23 See Taylor, supra note 4, at 39.
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the general topic of miracles, religion, and rationality-"We are fools
for Christ's sake"-and it evokes a firestorm of hostile criticism chal-
lenging Scalia's objectivity and fitness. Sitting Justice Harry Black-
mun, in 1994, tells a Harvard Law School audience how he would
likely vote in future cases involving a particular, hotly-disputed legal
issue-"I want to hang around and prevent those jokers from overrul-
ing Roe'24-and nobody bats an eye.
What gives? It seems to us that it is not the fact of expressing a
substantive opinion on a public issue, even a legal issue, that gives rise
to the "appearance of impropriety" objection on the part of those rais-
ing it; it is the particular substantive opinion expressed. It is the fact
that Scalia is expressing traditional religious views, and expressing
them very seriously, that is thought improper by some.
This raises an important point about First Amendment values: the
critics' collective attempt to silence Scalia is a classic instance of view-
point-based discrimination against the expression of particular opin-
ions or beliefs on particular subjects, a stance completely antithetical
to true freedom of expression.25 What makes Scalia's attackers so
squeamish is the fact that religion is being discussed in public, by a
public figure, in a personal and unabashed, even evangelical, way.
That is not how it's supposed to be done. Religion is supposed to be
invoked, if at all, only ceremonially by politicians, the invocation be-
ing as vacuous as possible so that we can all feel comfortable with its
essential meaninglessness. As Professor Raskin puts it: "We expect
Supreme Court justices to be the most secular of our public ser-
vants.... [W]e are uncomfortable about them flaunting [their reli-
gious] beliefs."26 Scalia's religious speech was startling-especially to
those so unfamiliar with his references that the speech struck them as
bizarre and dangerous-precisely because it had content and mean-
ing. It did not conform to secular modes of thinking about the
24 Jeff Bucholtz, Justice Blackmun Brings Overflow Crowd to Its Feet, HA"_v. L. REcoRa,
Mar. 11, 1994, at 1 (quoting Justice Blackmun). In fairness to Justice Blackmun, he
had notoriously gone on record numerous times in his judicial career as saying that
he believed in a constitutional right to abortion, and no abortion cases were then
pending before the Court. Similarly, Scalia's "no right to die" comments scarcely
surprise anyone familiar with his earlier judicial opinion on the subject, in Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292-301 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
25 We say "First Amendment values" rather than the First Amendment itself be-
cause we assume that no one seriously suggests that disciplinary action by any govern-
mental body should be taken against Justice Scalia. Rather, the censorship instinct
comes from private actors-journalists, pundits, advocates, professors-who are ad-
vancing their own censorial viewpoint (which they, too, are free to do). Our point is
that such censorial views are antithetical to free speech values.
26 Chandler, supra note 10, at F7.
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proper content of religious expression by public officials. This was
not pasty, cream-of-wheat-consistency politicians' religion-talk. It was
genuine Christian exhortation. 27
Interestingly, Justice Stephen Breyer, just one week to the day af-
ter Justice Scalia addessed the Christian Legal Society, addressed an
audience gathered in the Capitol Rotunda for the Annual Days of Re-
membrance, a ceremony commemorating the Holocaust. In a speech
extolling the process of reasoned justice employed in the Nuremberg
trials, Breyer described himself as a 'Jew, a judge, a Member of the
Supreme Court, '28 invoked religious references to Joseph and Deuter-
onomy, and, in closing, quoted from the Psalms: 'Justice and Law are
the foundations of Your Throne."2
9
No one has so much as hinted that Justice Breyer's remarks were
inappropriate. One might be tempted to distinguish the two speeches
on the ground that Breyer's remarks were more "cultural," whereas
Scalia's were more "religious," but that distinction is hardly workable.
Whether the recitation of the Torah is perceived as more religious or
more cultural will invariably depend on the biases of those making
that judgment. But a Jew's invocation of the Torah is not less reli-
gious that a Christian's invocation of First Corinthians simply because
it might be thought less provocative, any more than a Presbyterian's
expression of faith is less religious than a Pentecostal's simply because
it is less demonstrative. 30
The idea that a Supreme Courtjustice's statement of his own reli-
gious beliefs is somehow a threat to the First Amendment is simultane-
ously naive and itself a threat to freedom of speech and religion. It is
naive because it assumes that ajudge somehow becomes less religious
27 As Professor Philip Johnson has explained, "'once you start talking about the
God of the Bible, then you're talking about a God who makes moral demands and
plays a real role in the real world.... For many people, it's shocking to hear a
Supreme Court justice stand up and say he believes in that kind of God."' Terry
Mattingly, Justice Scalia: 'Fools for Christ's Sake,' KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Apr. 27,
1996, at B2 (quoting Professor Phillip E. Johnson of the University of California at
Berkeley).
28 Stephen G. Breyer, Keynote Address for the 1996 Days of Remembrance "Crimes
Against Humanity, Nuremberg, 1946," Capitol Rotunda, Washington, D.C., Apr. 16,
1996, at 1-2 (manuscript of speech on file with author Steffen Johnson); see also Rich-
ard Carelli, Justices' Faith Could Play a Role in 2 Pivotal Decisions: High Court to Tackle
Religion, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 25, 1997, at 32.
29 Breyer, supra note 28, at 6 (quoting Psalms 89:14).
30 We applaud both Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer, and we think both justices'
remarks were entirely appropriate and encouraging to their respective audiences. Yet
it is interesting to note that Breyer's remarks raised nary an eyebrow while Scalia's
were subjected to a firestorm of criticism.
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simply by not stating his views publicly. If holding religious beliefs
somehow constitutes a "bias"-a view inconsistent with the Religious
Test Clause of the Constitution 3 -that bias exists whether or not it is
expressed publicly. Scalia has strong opinions on a number of issues,
a fact of which no reader of his judicial opinions can be unaware. It
may even be that Scalia's religious views affect his interpretive method
or judicial philosophy (though they certainly do not appear to trans-
late neatly or automatically into "pro-religion" rulings32), just as other
justices' personal views and opinions doubtless affect their perform-
ance as judges. Hiding such views does not mean they do not exist.
But more fundamentally, to assert that a judge's possession or
expression of religious opinions is improper is to discriminate against
a certain set of views, in violation of everything most dear to the values
of the First Amendment. A justice can be a feminist and say so. A
justice can be an environmentalist and say so. Ajustice can be a con-
servative and say so. But a justice cannot be religious and say so?
In sum, the judicial ethics argument seems a product of either
sloppy thinking or a bias against the expression of religious ideas in
particular. Or perhaps it is some combination of both; for it does
seem that a near-reflexive bias against serious religious belief and ex-
pression has a tendency to generate uncommonly sloppy thinking.
Was this perhaps part of Scalia's point? His point about the response
of secularists to miracles and reports of miracles is in part a descrip-
tion of ingrained bias affecting intellectual judgment: Why isn't the
proper response to a reported miracle to investigate the phenomenon
with an open mind, and, if it cannot otherwise be explained, to be
31 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 3; see Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Codispoti, 69
F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 1995) (Noonan, J.) (rejecting argument that Judge Noonan must
recuse himself, because of his strongly held religious beliefs, from a case involving
abortion, on the ground that the argument is inconsistent with the Religious Test
Clause of Article VI). Judge Noonan's opinion rejects any suggestion that "fervently-
held" religious beliefs are somehow distinguishable from those "lukewarmly main-
tained," for purposes of the Religious Test Clause: "A moment's consideration shows
that the distinction is not workable.... No thermometer exists for measuring the
heatedness of a religious belief objectively. Either religious belief disqualifies or it
does not. Under Article VI it does not." Id. at 400.
32 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith, which substan-
tially diminished the level of constitutional protection afforded the free exercise of
religion, is perhaps Scalia's most notorious majority opinion, and the only one that
produced a near-unanimous act of Congress seeking to vitiate the holding through
enactment of enhanced statutory protection for religious exercise. See Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb (1994)) (RFRA). The constitutionality of RFRA is currently before the
Court. See Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293
(1996).
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willing to accept it as true? Why isn't an attitude of a priori rejection of
the possibility of miracles, the supernatural, and religious truth con-
sidered narrow-minded and anti-intellectual? The answer is that the
anti-religious bias in our elite culture does produce unclear thinking:
unclear thinking about religion, unclear thinking about judicial eth-
ics, and-as we shall see-unclear thinking about the constitutional
law of religious freedom of expression.
IV. IGNORANCE, INTOLERANCE, AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Scalia's point was not to indict the secular media and elite cul-
ture. But at least one of our points is. With a kind of ironic reverse-
english, the media's and pundits' reaction to Scalia's speech actually
tends to prove the point they (wrongly) thought Scalia was trying to
make: that religious persons and religious ideas have suffered outra-
geous mistreatment at the hands of the secular media and the elite
culture. When opinion-makers do not understand, or attempt to un-
derstand, religious ideas and values, their treatment of them will inevi-
tably be insensitive, wooden, and riddled with shallow stereotypes and
misconceptions. The charge that Scalia's speech violated some stan-
dard ofjudicial ethics also turns out to backfire: the charge reduces to
a bias against judges' personal-capacity expressions of religious opin-
ions, but not of other opinions. When opinion-makers possess a re-
flexive bias against religion (perhaps fed by ignorance), they will tend
not to recognize their own discrimination as such.
Such attitudes, we submit, are affirmatively destructive of First
Amendment religious liberty. Ignorance about religion breeds intol-
erance of religion, which exerts a downward gravitational pull on the
protection of religious liberty. In short, ignorance drags liberty.
Worse, once the value of religious liberty and religious ideas is de-
graded, religious expression comes to be treated as suspect, leading to
the degradation of its status as a constitutional right.
If these attitudes were confined to the media, it would be bad
enough. Unfortunately, however, such attitudes are prevalent not
only among reporters and columnists, but among bureaucrats
charged with administering government programs and, with distres-
sing frequency, judges charged with the interpretation and enforce-
ment of First Amendment rights. Even if Scalia had been engaged in
"flirtation with Christian victimology,"33 there is surely a grain of truth
in the proposition that religious ideas are treated disparagingly by
modern society. One need look no further than the scornful columns
33 See Taylor, supra note 4, at 39.
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of Stuart Taylor, Joan Biskupic, and Clay Chandler for evidence of
such treatment. But one finds further support in the stories of cases
that have ended up in the courts. Several of these stories parallel the
story of Scalia's speech: religious expression, misunderstood or
feared, is singled out for discrimination.
We offer just one such case by way of illustration: Settle v. Dickson
County School Board, to which we give the subtitle 'Jesus Christ Gets a
Zero. '34 Settle is an absolutely amazing case of fear and misunder-
standing of religious expression. A ninth grade English teacher as-
signed her students the task of choosing a topic for, and writing, a
research paper. The students could choose any topic they wished, so
long as it was "researchable"-in the sense that students would be re-
quired to make use of at least four secondary sources, like books, ency-
clopedias, magazines, or pamphlets-as well as "interesting" and
"decent."3 5 The teacher accepted topics on reincarnation, witchcraft,
black magic and the occult, and spiritualism (ghosts and supernatural
encounters with the deceased), as well as topics ranging from the
Pony Express to a 1920s jazz singer.
3 6
But the teacher rejected Brittney Settle's topic: "The Life ofJesus
Christ." There was some question about whether Brittney had given
the teacher fair notice, as she had changed her topic between the
sign-up and the initial outline stages, but that was not the teacher's
explanation (at least not at first). Rather, the teacher said, addressing
the topic of the life ofJesus Christ was "not an appropriate thing to do
in a public school" because of its religious nature. It "was inappropri-
ate because.., it was dealing with her personal religion, her personal
Savior."37 The student stood firm in her desired topic, and the
teacher stood firm in her refusal to permit it, meaning that the debate
was played out in the principal's office with Brittney's parents. The
teacher defended the distinction between other papers that had been
accepted on the ground that reincarnation, spiritualism, and the oc-
cult do not address religious topics. The teacher and principal also
refused to permit Brittney to modify the topic to address "psychologi-
cal and scientific aspects ofJesus Christ." Brittney turned in her paper
34 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 518 (1995); seeNat Hentoff, A Zero
forJesus in a Public Schoo4 WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1996, at A23. In the interest of full
disclosure, the reader should note that Professor Paulsen was counsel for Brittney
Settle in her unsuccessful petition for certiorari.
35 Settle, 53 F.3d at 153.
36 Id. at 159 (Batchelder, J., concurring).
37 Id. at 154.
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on the life ofJesus Christ, and the teacher refused to read it, assigning
her a grade of "zero" for failure to complete the assignment.
3 8
Antonin Scalia has it easy; life tenure means never having to say
you're sorry. Brittney Settle was stuck with a zero on (as our parents
used to say) her "permanent record." The superintendent, school
board, and federal courts backed up the teacher and principal. Why?
In part, the explanation is that, by the time the matter got to litiga-
tion, the teacher had come up with several additional reasons why she
had turned down Brittney Settle's topic, including the procedural ar-
gument of lack of notice (which seems distinctly disingenuous, under
the overall circumstances). That argument was sufficiently shaky that
the teacher felt compelled to reinforce it with at least five others that
the courts identified. Among them was the assertion that Brittney's
strong personal belief in Jesus Christ would make it difficult for her to
write a dispassionate research paper; that Brittney "knew a lot about
Jesus Christ," and therefore "could produce an outline without doing
any significant research, and thus defeat the purpose of the exercise";
and that "the law says we are not to deal with religious issues in the
classroom."3 9
The evidence suggested that (to put it mildly) the teacher may
have applied some of these criteria selectively. In this regard, the
pretextual explanation we like best is the teacher's assertion that it
would be impossible to find four sources on the life ofJesus Christ, as
"all of the sources that you [are] going to find documenting the life of
Jesus Christ derive from one source, the Bible." 4° (Matthew, Mark,
Luke, and John? "Q"? There is, of course, a rather notable abun-
dance of secondary literature on the life of Jesus.) We don't know
whether it is worse to hope that this was clumsiness in fabricating a
pretext or to believe that the teacher really thought her statement to
be true. It is discouraging to think that a community's respected
ninth grade English teacher is, apparently, either lying or in need of a
remedial education of her own. It is also discouraging to see school
officials rallying to support such actions by their teachers.
The courts' actions in upholding the school district's position at
first appear somewhat easier to explain: they didn't want to get in-
volved in supervising paper topics for junior high school English
classes. Both the district court and the court of appeals basically
adopted holdings of broad deference-extremely broad, on these
facts-to school officials'judgments. The Sixth Circuit held that all of
38 Id.
39 Id. at 154-55 (quoting the school teacher, Ms. Ramsey).
40 Id.
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the reasons given by the teacher "fall within the broad leeway of teach-
ers to determine the nature of the curriculum and the grades to be
awarded to students, even the reasons that may be mistaken.
''41
The deference argument is a fair one. But it is hard to imagine a
court taking such an unequivocally hands-off approach if the subject
been something other than traditional religion. Suppose, for exam-
ple, Brittney Settle had been a young lesbian who proposed to chroni-
cle the history of the gay and lesbian movement, but the teacher had
rejected her proposal on the ground that "dealing with sexual orienta-
tion-personal sexual preference" is "just not an appropriate thing to
do in a public school."42 Or suppose Brittney were a member of a
racial minority group and proposed to write a paper on the evils of
racial segregation, but the teacher refused her request on the ground
that Brittney's own racial identity or her strong personal belief in end-
ing racism would make it difficult for her to write a dispassionate re-
search paper. Suppose the teacher had said to Brittney, "Since you're
African-American, you obviously know a lot about racism, and I won't
allow you to write about it because you could prepare an outline with-
out much work and therefore defeat the purpose of the assignment."
Perhaps the outcome would have been the same, but we doubt it.43
Certainly, the courts would not have responded so charitably to a
teacher and school district that defended their actions on the ground
that "the law says we are not to deal with issues [of racism] in the
classroom."
The interesting part of the Settle story is thus the attitudes toward
religious expression in particular that the case reveals-at each level of
the dispute. Why did the teacher initially recoil at Brittney Settle's
choice of a paper topic? Why should religious expression have been
treated with such unique suspicion or hostility? The answer, perhaps,
is that an entire generation of educators has come of age since the
School Prayer and Bible Reading cases of the early 1960s and learned
41 Id. at 156 (emphasis added).
42 Compare Gay & Lesbian Students Ass'n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 362 (8th Cir.
1988) (holding that when state university funds student organizations, it may not dis-
criminate among otherwise eligible recipients on content-based or ideological
grounds), with Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir.
1994) (stating that university may not, absent compelling justification, discriminate
against recipients of student funding on content- or viewpoint-based grounds, but
avoidance of Establishment Clause violation constitutes compelling interest justifying
such discrimination if recipient would use funds to express religious viewpoints),
rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
43 Cf. Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1973) (state university may
not deny funding to otherwise eligible publication on the ground that the publication
advocates racial segregation).
1997]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
a shorthand-and inaccurate-version of First Amendment law, along
the lines of "no religion in the schools." Ignorance of the law leads to
hostility toward religion, rather than simply the absence of govern-
ment-sponsored religion. Moreover, "no religion in the schools" be-
comes more than an incorrect principle'of law to be obeyed; it
becomes a mantra concerning what is desirable and what is undesir-
able. Religion has no place in school (or in the public sphere gener-
ally) because it is-in the words of Brittney's teacher, "not an
appropriate thing to do in a public school."44
It is a slippery slope from ignorance of religion to suspicion of
religion to hostility toward religion. The final step, of course, is sup-
pression of religious expression and religious ideas by government
officials, and the more-than-occasional ratification of such suppres-
sion by the courts. Ignorance of religion itself becomes a tool in that
process: reincarnation, black magic, the occult, and witchcraft do not
address religious ideas, but "The Life ofJesus Christ" does. There do
not exist four sources on the life of Jesus Christ. It is somewhat
startling that any ninth grade teacher would say such things. It is in-
credible-but extremely instructive-that the principal, the superin-
44 Settle, 53 F.3d at 154. It should go without saying that the study of religion, like
the study of philosophy, history, and language, has a place in public school class-
rooms. (Indeed, the teacher's own actions in permitting other students to write on
spiritualism, reincarnation, and magic suggest that even she would concede as much.)
As the Supreme Court has explained:
[I] t might well be said that one's education is not complete without a study
of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the
advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy
of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here
indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objec-
tively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consist-
ently with the First Amendment.
School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1962). This should
go without saying, but unfortunately it no longer can be assumed. It is by now a
commonplace observation that religious references have been excised almost entirely
from public school texts and public school curricula. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell,
"God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!: Freedom of Religion in the Post-modem Age, 1993
BYU L. REV. 163, 180-81 & nn.63-64 (collecting authorities documenting the absence
of even references to religion in public education); McConnell, Neutrality Under the
Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 146, 162 (1986).
If the public school day and all its teaching is strictly secular, the child is
likely to learn the lesson that religion is irrelevant to the significant things of
this world, or at least that the spiritual realm is radically separate and distinct
from the temporal. However unintended, these are lessons about religion.
They are not 'neutral.' Studious silence on a subject that parents may say
touches all of life is an eloquent refutation.
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tendent, the school board, a federal district judge, and three court of
appeals judges would all go along.
There are literally scores of similar cases that illustrate the point
equally well: students being hauled to the principal's office for pray-
ing in the cafeteria or publicly stating a belief in God, student Bible
study groups being refused permission to meet on the school lawn or
an empty classroom during lunch hour or before or after school, reli-
gious groups being excluded from privileges solely on account of their
religious identity.4 5 There are certainly enough examples so that
those who make this point cannot be dismissed as "whining wimps of
victimology."46 To the contrary, these are only the victims who have
fought for their rights in court.
The critics of Scalia would, evidently, prefer that such persons
exercise their right to remain silent. Any other course, in their view, is
"whining," a "right-wing litmus test," or simply introduces inappropri-
ate topics into public discussion. Such reactions are deeply instructive
about the state of society and the present condition of religious lib-
erty, in terms of the public atmosphere in which issues of religion and
religious freedom are debated, litigated, and decided. One of the
more ill-reasoned criticisms of Scalia's sermonette, raised by a few crit-
ics, is that the fact that a Supreme Court justice is allowed to make
such a speech proves that religious freedom is alive and well in
America and therefore disproves Scalia's point.47 True, an Antonin
Scalia may say what he wishes-and receive "merely" a tirade of scorn.
But that does not make what Scalia said less real for others. The
Brittney Settles of the world often may not say what they wish.
45 For a partial list, see the examples collected in Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Funny
Thing Happened on the Way to the Limited Public Forum: Unconstitutional Conditions on
"EqualAccess"for Religious Speakers and Groups, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 658-70 & n.22
(1996). There are also several reported cases very much like Settle, both in their facts
and in their results. See DeNooyer v. Livonia Pub. Sch., 799 F. Supp. 744, 749 (E.D.
Mich. 1992) (second grade student forbidden from making show-and-tell presenta-
tion about her participation in church choir), afl'd without published opinion, 1 F.3d
1240, 12 F.3d 211 (6th Cir. 1993); Duran v. Nitsche, 780 F. Supp. 1048, 1052-55 (E.D.
Pa. 1991) (student forbidden from making classroom oral report on "The Power of
God" in fulfillment of assignment to prepare a presentation on some variation on
"The Power of "), vacated and appeal dismissed, 972 F.2d 1331 (3d Cir. 1992); Gui-
dry v. Calcasieu Parish Sch. Bd., 9 Religious Freedom Rep. (Church-State Resource
Ctr.) 118 (E.D. La. 1989) (high school class valedictorian forbidden from speaking at
commencement because of her expressed intention to mention her personal reli-
gious beliefs in her address), aff'd on jurisdictional grounds sub nom. Guidry v. Brous-
sard, 897 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1990).
46 See Taylor, supra note 4, at 37.
47 See, e.g., Chandler, supra note 10, at F7 (quoting Eliot Mincberg, legal director
of People for the American Way).
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These cases are also instructive about the circumstances in which
committed religious believers of all kinds-Christians, Muslims, Jews,
Hindus, Rastafarians, and others-find themselves today, in relation
to the nation's elite institutions. Justice Scalia's comments were ad-
dressed to his coreligionists, Christians, in noting the existence of
such attitudes and suggesting the proper Christian response: to reject
the so-called wisdom of the worldly wise, in favor of the foolishness of
faith in God.
One must indeed question the wisdom, and spirit of tolerance, of
those who would find in such remarks something to be feared, ridi-
culed, condemned, and extirpated.
